Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e. inputs that are imperceptibly perturbed from natural data and yet incorrectly classified by the network. Adversarial training [34] , a heuristic form of robust optimization that alternates between minimization and maximization steps, has proven to be among the most successful methods to train networks that are robust against a pre-defined family of perturbations. This paper provides a partial answer to the success of adversarial training. When the inner maximization problem can be solved to optimality, we prove that adversarial training finds a network of small robust train loss. When the maximization problem is solved by a heuristic algorithm, we prove that adversarial training finds a network of small robust surrogate train loss. The analysis technique leverages recent work on the analysis of neural networks via Neural Tangent Kernel (NTK), combined with online-learning when the maximization is solved by a heuristic, and the expressiveness of the NTK kernel in the ℓ ∞ -norm.
Introduction
Recent studies have demonstrated that neural network models, despite achieving humanlevel performance on many important tasks, are not robust to adversarial examples-a small and human imperceptible input perturbation can easily change the prediction label [45, 24] . This phenomenon brings out security concerns when deploying neural network models to real world systems [22] . In the past few years, many defense algorithms have been developed [25, 44, 33, 30, 40] to improve the network's robustness, but most of them are still vulnerable under stronger attacks, as reported in [3] . Among current defense methods, adversarial training [34] has become one of the most successful methods to train robust neural networks.
To obtain a robust network, we need to consider the "robust loss" instead of a regular loss. The robust loss is defined as the maximal loss within an ǫ-ball around each sample, and minimizing the robust loss under empirical distribution leads to a min-max optimization problem. Adversarial training [34] is a way to minimize the robust loss. At each iteration, it (approximately) solves the inner maximization problem by an attack algorithm A to get an adversarial sample, and then runs a (stochastic) gradient-descent update to minimize the loss on the adversarial sample. Although adversarial training has been widely used in practice and hugely improves the robustness of neural networks in many applications, its convergence properties are still unknown. It is unclear whether a network with small robust error exists and whether adversarial training is able to converge to a solution with minimal train adversarial loss.
In this paper, we study the convergence of adversarial training algorithms and try to answer the above questions on over-parameterized neural networks. We consider the setting where the neural network has H layers with width m, smooth activation, and n training samples. This assumption holds for many activation functions including the soft-plus and sigmoid. Our contributions are summarized below.
• For a general attack/perturbation algorithm A, we show that gradient descent converges to a network where the robust surrogate loss with respect to the attack A is within ǫ of the optimal robust loss, when the width m ≥ 2 O(H) n ǫ 2 (Theorem 4.1).
• We then consider the expressivity of neural networks w.r.t. robust loss (or robust interpolation). We show when the width m is sufficiently large, the neural network can achieve optimal robust loss ǫ; see Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 for precise statement. By combining these results, we show that adversarial training finds networks of small robust training loss (Corollary 5.1 and Corollary 5.2).
• Conversely, the complexity of robust learning is higher. We show that the VCDimension of the model class which can robustly interpolate any n samples is lower bounded by Ω(nd) where d is the dimension. In contrast, there are neural net architectures that can interpolate n samples with only O(n) parameters. For this class of architectures the VC-Dimension is upper bounded by O(n log n). Thus robust learning provably requires larger complexity and capacity.
Related Work
Attack and Defense Adversarial examples are inputs that are slightly perturbed from a natural sample and yet incorrectly classified by the model. An adversarial example can be generated by maximizing the loss function within an ǫ-ball around a natural sample. Thus, generating adversarial examples can be viewed as solving a constrained optimization problem and can be (approximately) solved by a projected gradient descent (PGD) method [34] . Some other techniques have also been proposed in the literature including l-BFGS [45] , FGSM [24] , iterative FGSM [28] and C&W attack [14] , where they differ from each other by the distance measurements, loss function or optimization algorithms.
There are also studies on adversarial attacks with limited information about the target model. For instance, [15, 26, 10, 32] considered the black-box setting where the model is hidden but the attacker can make queries and get the corresponding outputs of the model. Improving the robustness of neural networks against adversarial attacks, also known as defense, has been recognized as an important and unsolved problem in machine learning. Various kinds of defense methods have been proposed [25, 44, 33, 30, 40] , but many of them are based on obfuscated gradients which does not really improve robustness under stronger attacks [3] . As an exception, [3] reported that the adversarial training method developed in [34] is the only defense that works even under carefully designed attacks.
Adversarial Training Adversarial training is one of the first defense ideas proposed in earlier papers [24] . The main idea is to add adversarial examples into the training set to improve the robustness. However, earlier work usually only adds adversarial example once or only few times during the training phase. Recently, [34] showed that adversarial training can be viewed as solving a min-max optimization problem where the training algorithm aims to minimize the robust loss, defined as the maximal loss within a certain ǫ-ball around each training sample. Based on this formulation, a clean adversarial training procedure based on PGD-attack has been developed and achieved state-of-the-art results even under strong attacks. This also motivates some recent research on gaining theoretical understanding of robust error [11, 41] . Also, adversarial training suffers from slow training time since it runs several steps of attacks within one update, and several recent works are trying to resolve this issue [42, 53] . From the theoretical perspective, a recent work [46] considers to quantitatively evaluate the convergence quality of adversarial examples found in the inner maximization and therefore ensure robustness. [51] consider generalization upper and lower bounds for robust generalization. [31] improves the robust generalization by data augmentation with GAN. [23] considers to reduce the optimization of min-max problem to online learning setting and use their results to analyze the convergence of GAN. In this paper, our analysis for adversarial is quite general and is not restricted to any specific kind of attack algorithm.
Certified Defense and Robustness Verification For each sample, the robust loss is defined as the max loss within an ǫ-ball. Due to the non-convexity, attack algorithms usually fail to find the exact max, so robust error computed by an attack algorithm cannot give us a formal guarantee of robustness. As a consequence, networks trained by standard adversarial training algorithms [34] , although being robust under strong attacks, do not have a certified guarantee of robustness.
Neural network verification methods, in contrast to attack, are trying to find upper bounds of robust error and provide certified robustness measurements. Several algorithms have been proposed recently. [48] proposed to solve the dual of a linear relaxation problem to obtain a certified bound. [47, 54] provides a similar algorithm based on primal relaxation. [43] proposed another approach based on abstract interpretation. More recently, [39] provided a unified view, showing that most of the existing verification methods are based on a convex relaxation of ReLU network.
Equipped with these verification methods for computing upper bounds of robust error, one can then apply adversarial training to get a network with certified robustness. This is first proposed in [48] . At each iteration, instead of finding a lower bound of robust error by attack, we can find an upper bound of robust error by verification and and train the model to minimize this upper bound. Several certified adversarial training algorithms along this line have been proposed recently [49, 21] . Our analysis in Section 4 can incorporate certified adversarial training.
Global convergence of Gradient Descent Recent work on the over-parametrization of neural networks prove that when the width greatly exceeds the sample size, gradient descent converges to a global minimizer from random initialization [29, 19, 20, 1, 55] . The key idea in the earlier literature is to show that the Jacobian w.r.t. parameters has minimum singular value lower bounded, and thus there is a global minimum near every random initialization, with high probability. However for the robust loss and robust surrogate loss, the maximization cannot be evaluated and the Jacobian is not necessarily full rank. Similarly with the robust surrogate loss, the heuristic attack algorithm may not even be continuous and so the same arguments cannot be utilized.
Preliminaries

Notation
Let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We use N (0, I) to denote the standard Gaussian distribution. For a vector v, we use v 2 to denote the Euclidean norm. For a matrix A we use A F to denote the Frobenius norm and A 2 to denote the operator norm. We use ·, · to denote the standard Euclidean inner product between two vectors or matrices. We let O(·) and Ω (·) denote standard Big-O and Big-Omega notations that suppress multiplicative constants.
Neural Network
In this paper we focus on the training of multilayer fully-connected neural networks. Formally, we consider a neural network of the following form.
Let x ∈ R d be the input, the fully-connected neural network is defined as follows:
is the weight at the h-th layer for 2 ≤ h ≤ H, a ∈ R m×1 is the output layer and σ(·) is the activation function. 1 The
We define the prediction function recursively (for simplicity we let x (0) = x):
where
is a scaling factor to normalize the input at initialization.
We make a technical assumption on the activation function σ(·) which holds for many activation functions, although not the ReLU. 
The key architectural parameter is the width m. As we shall see, the robust train loss we obtain scales inversely with the width m, and so for overparametrized networks we are able to minimize the robust train loss.
Perturbation and the Surrogate Loss Function
The goal of adversarial training is to make the model robust in a neighbor of each datum. We first introduce the definition of the perturbation set function to determine the perturbation set at each points. 
Definition 3.1 (Perturbation Set). The perturbation set function is
, we say that the perturbation set is compatible with the dataset if B(x i ) ∩ B(x j ) = φ implies y i = y j . In the rest of the paper, we will always assume that B is compatible to the given data. Our framework allows for arbitrary perturbation sets compatible with the empirical dataset.
Given a perturbation set, we are now ready to define the perturbation function that map a data point to another point inside its perturbation set. We note that the perturbation function can be quite general including the identity function, the adversarial attack mapping and some random sample mapping. Formally, we give the following definition.
Definition 3.2 (Perturbation Function). A perturbation function is defined as a function
where B(x) refers to the perturbation set defined in Definition 3.1.
With the definition of perturbation function, we can now define a large family of loss functions on the training set {x i ,
. We will show this definition covers the standard loss used in empirical risk minimization and the robust loss used in adversarial training. 
It can be easily observed that the standard training loss L(W) is a special case of surrogate loss function with A as the identity. The goal of adversarial training is to minimize the robust loss, i.e. L A (W) with A(W, x) = argmax x∈B(x) ℓ(f (W, A(W, x)), y). We denote the robust loss as L * (W).
Convergence Results of Adversarial Training
We consider optimizing the surrogate loss L A with the perturbation function A(W, x) defined in Definition 3.2. In this section, we will prove that after certain steps of projected gradient descent with a convex set R(W 0 , B), the loss L A is provably upper-bounded with the best minimax loss in this set.
where w
is the r-th row of W (h) and w Denote the parameter W at the k-th iteration as W k , and similarly W k,(h) and w k,(h) r . For each step in adversarial training, projected gradient descent takes an update
the gradient ∇ W f is with respect to the first argument W, and P R is the Euclidean projection to a convex set R. We will take R as the convex set R(W 0 , B) defined in Equation (2).
We show that for sufficiently wide neural networks, within the set R(W 0 , B) in the parameter space, gradient descent can find a point with surrogate loss no more than the minimum robust loss in R(W 0 , B). In Section 5, we show that the set R(W 0 , B) is sufficiently large to find a classifier of low robust loss. We assume the perturbation set of the input B(x) is in a Euclidean ball with radius e and e ≤ 1. Specifically, we have the following theorem. −Ω(H) , then with probability 0.99,
, we have
).
Remark. Recall that the surrogate loss L A (W) is the loss suffered when with respect to the perturbation function A. For example if the adversary uses the projected gradient ascent algorithm, then the theorem guarantees that projected gradient ascent cannot successfully attack the learned network.
Remark. For two-layer networks H = 1, the update on W does not require the projection step as it is implicitly enforced by gradient descent.
Proof Sketch
Our proof idea utilizes the same high-level intuition as [29, 19, 55, 12, 13] that near the initialization the network is linear. However, unlike these earlier works, the surrogate loss neither smooth, nor semi-smooth so there is no Polyak gradient domination phenomenon to allow for the global geometric contraction of gradient descent. In fact due to the the generality of perturbation function A allowed, the robust surrogate loss is not differentiable nor even continuous in W, and so the standard analysis cannot be applied. Our analysis utilizes two key observations. First the network f (W, A(W, x)) is still smooth w.r.t. the first argument 2 , and is close to linear in the first argument near initialization, which is shown by directly bounding the Hessian w.r.t. W. Second, the perturbation function A can be treated as an adversary providing a worst-case loss function ℓ A (f, y) as done in online learning. However, online learning typically assumes the sequence of losses is convex, which is not the case here. We make a careful decoupling of the contribution to nonconvexity from the first argument and the worst-case contribution from the perturbation function, we can prove gradient descent succeeds in minimizing the surrogate loss.
Adversarial Training Finds Robust Classifier
Motivated by the optimization result in Theorem 4.1, we hope to show that there is indeed a robust classifier in R(W 0 , B). To show this, we utilize the connection between neural networks and their induced Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS) via viewing neural networks trained near initialization as a random feature scheme [16, 17, 27, 2] . Since we only need to show the existence of a network architecture that robustly fits the training data in R(W 0 , B) and neural networks are at least as expressive as their induced kernels, we may prove this via the RKHS connection. The strategy is to first show the existence of a robust classifier in the RKHS, and then show that a sufficiently wide network can approximate the kernel via random feature analysis. The results of this section will have, in general, exponential in dimension dependence due to the known issue of d-dimensional functions having exponentially large RKHS norm [4] , so only offer qualitative guidance on existence of robust classifiers.
Since deep networks contain two-layer networks as a sub-network, and this section is only concerned with expressivity, we focus on the local expressivity of two-layer networks. We write the standard two-layer network in the suggestive way
and initialize as w r ∼ N (0,
) andw r is set to be equal to w r , a r is randomly drawn from {1, −1} and a ′ r = −a r . We denote w r0 , a r0 ,w r0 , a ′ r0 the initialization parameters respectively. In this section, we will consider the data and perturbation set defined on the surface S of the unit ball, i.e. we assume x ∈ S and B(x) ⊂ S.
For convenience, we firstly introduce the Neural Tangent Kernel (NTK) [27] w.r.t. our neural network formulation in Equation (1).
Definition 5.1 (NTK [27] ). The NTK with activation function σ (·) and initialization distribution w ∼ N (0,
For a given kernel K, there is a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) introduced by K. We denote it as H(K). We refer the readers to [37] for an introduction of the theory of RKHS.
In Section 5.1, we will first give a general existence result of classifier with robust loss no more than ǫ for two-layer networks with activation functions that induce universal kernels. Secondly, specifically for a two-layer quadratic-ReLU activation neural network, we show that adversarial training can find a robust classifier, and provide the explicit dependence of the width m w.r.t. ǫ.
Existence of Robust Classifier near Initialization
We formally make the following assumption, which is later verified when the activation induces an universal kernel. [35] . In addition, we will show that this assumption is mild in our example of quadratic-ReLU network.
Under this assumption, by applying the strategy of approximating the infinite situation by finite sum of random features, we can get the following theorem: 
Therefore, adversarial training is guaranteed to find a robust classifier under a given attack algorithm when the network width is sufficiently large.
Example: Two-layer Quadratic-ReLU Network
We consider the arc-cosine neural tangent kernel (NTK) introduced by two-layer network with quadratic ReLU activation function as a guide example. In this section, we quantitatively derive the dependency of ǫ for B D,B,ǫ and m in Theorem 5.1 for this two-layer network and verify that the induced kernel is universal. The network has the expression
where the activation σ(x) = ReLU (x) 2 (ReLU (x) = max{0, x}), and a is initialized uniformly from {±1}, and W is initialized i.i.d. from N (0, 1) and only W is trained. The NTK has the following explicit expression:
We denote · H the RKHS norm of H(K σ ). The following lemma gives a sufficient condition for the function to be in H(K σ ). • B(x i ) is compact set on S for all i,
• There does not exist x,x and i, j such that
Under this assumption, one can easily construct a smooth classifier g on S such that g(x) = y i for all x ∈ B(x i ). By Lemma 5.1, we have g ∈ H(K σ ) with RKHS norm g H ≤ C D where C D is a constant only depends on dataset D and perturbation function. We then approximate g using random feature techniques. The following theorem provides the desired result:
Theorem 5.2 (Approximation by finite sum). For a given Lipschitz function
and C D,B is a constant that only depends on the dataset D and the compatible perturbation B. Then with probability at least 1 − δ, there exists c 1 , · · · , c M where
We then specializes Theorem 4.1 for our two-layer quadratic-ReLU network. We make a modification to the set R(W 0 , B) defined in Equation (2) in order to match the previous approximation results, which iŝ
Due to this modification and that for two-layer the projection step to the setR is unnecessary, we provide a full proof in Appendix C.
Theorem 5.3 (Convergence of Gradient Descent for Optimizing Surrogate Loss For Two-layer Networks). Suppose the input x is bounded, and the loss function satisfies Assumption 3.2. For the two-layer network defined in Equation (5), if we run projected gradient descent based on the convex constraint setR(W 0 , B) with a small stepsize α, then for any
Then, we can get an overall theorem for the quadratic-ReLU network which is similar to Corollary 5.1 but with explicit ǫ dependence: ) steps, then with probability 0.99,
6 Capacity Requirement of Robustness
In this section, we will show that in order to achieve adversarially robust interpolation (which is formally defined below), one needs more capacity than just normal interpolation. In fact, empirical evidence have already shown that to reliably withstand strong adversarial attacks, networks require a significantly larger capacity than for correctly classifying benign examples only [34] . This implies, in some sense, that using a neural network with larger width is necessary.
, where δ is a constant, we will consider each n data in S δ and use B δ as the perturbation set function in this section.
We begin with the definition of the interpolation class and the robust interpolation class.
Definition 6.1 (Interpolation class). We say that a function class F of functions
4 is an n-interpolation class, if the following is satisfied:
. 4 Here we let the classification output be ±1, and a usual classifier f outputing a number in R is treated as sign(f ) here.
Definition 6.2 (Robust interpolation class). We say that a function class F is an n-robust interpolation class, if the following is satisfied:
We will use the VC-Dimension of a function class F to measure its complexity. In fact, as shown in [6] (Equation (2)), for neural networks there is a tight connection between the number of parameters W , the number of layers H and their VC-Dimension Ω(HW log(W/L)) ≤ VC-Dimension ≤ O(HW log W ). In addition, combining with the results in [52] (Theorem 3) which shows the existence of a 4-layer neural network with O(n) parameters that can interpolate any n data points, i.e. an interpolation class, we have that an n-interpolation class can be realized by a fixed depth neural network with VC-Dimension upper bound VC-Dimension ≤ O(n log n).
For a general hypothesis class F , we can evidently see that when F is an n-interpolation class, F has VC-Dimension at least n. For a neural network that is an n-interpolation class, without further architectural constraints, this lower bound of its VC-dimension is tight up to logarithmic factors as indicated in 13. However, we show that for a robust-interpolation class we will have a much larger VC-Dimension lower bound: 
where d is the dimension of the input space.
For neural networks, Equation (14) shows that any architecture that is an n-robust interpolation class should have VC-Dimension at least Ω(nd). Comparing with Equation (13) which shows n-interpolation class can be realized by a network architecture with VC-Dimension O(n log n), we can conclude that robust interpolation by neural networks needs more capacity, so increasing the width of neural network is indeed necessary.
Discussion
This work provides a theoretical analysis of the empirically successful adversarial training algorithm in the training of robust neural networks. Our main results indicate that adversarial training will find a network of low robust surrogate loss, even when the maximization is computed via a heuristic algorithm such as projected gradient ascent. We feel these results lead to several thought-provoking future steps. Can we ensure the robust surrogate loss is low with respect to a larger family of perturbation functions than that used during training? It is natural to ask whether the depth dependence can be improved to poly(H) using the tools of [1] , and whether the projection step can be removed as it is empirically unnecessary and also unnecessary for our analysis for H = 1. On the expressiveness side, the current argument utilizes that a neural net restricted to a local region can approximate its induced RKHS. Although the RKHS is universal, they do not avoid the curse of dimension, so it is natural to ask whether the robust expressivity of neural networks can adapt to structure such as low latent dimension of the data mechanism [18, 50] . Since this question is largely unanswered even for neural nets in the non-robust setting, we leave it to future work.
A Proof of Convergence Results for Deep Nets in Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
F . We will perform T steps of projected gradient descent with step size α and then stop.
For projected gradient descent, W k ∈ R(W 0 , B) holds for all k = 1, · · · , T . Recall the update rule of projected gradient descent is
where in the first inequality we use that fact that when we project a point onto R(W 0 , B), we move closer to every point in R(W 0 , B), and in particular, any optimal point. Now we need to analyze the gradient
To simplify notations, we define
Since the loss function l is Lipschitz, we know |l
i is a diagonal matrix whose i-th diagonal entry is σ ′ (w
To bound the RHS, note that he definition of
According to Lemma B.1, B.3 and G.2 in [19] , with probability 0.99, we have for all
. Therefore, under our choice of m, we have
Also note that by the Lipschitz-ness of our neural network, it is easy to show x
= O(1) due to the Lipschitzness of our activation function, we have
which gives the bound of the third term of Equation 15 . Now we are going to bound the second term of Equation 15 . Note that letting ∆W = W * − W k , we have
Note that both W k , W s ∈ R(W 0 , B), again using Lemma B.3 in [19] , we have
Recall w
, it is easy to show
by the definition of J (l)
i , we know,
Thus, according to Lemma G.1 in [19] , we have
Recall that d k+1 < 2B, we have
Choosing T = Ω(
) and α = 2 −Ω(H) , under the choice of m, we complete the proof.
B Proof of Gradient Descent Finding Robust Classifier in Section 5
B.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
As discussed in Section 5.1, we will use the idea of random feature [38] to approximate g ∈ H(K σ ) on the unit sphere. We consider functions of the form
where c(w) :
where p 0 (w) is the probability density function of N (0,
which is the distribution of initialization. Define the function class with finite N (0,
Lemma B.1 (Universality of F RF ). Let F RF and H(K σ ) be defined as above. Then F RF is dense in H(K σ ) w.r.t. · ∞,S , where f ∞,S = sup x∈S |f (x)|.
Proof.
Observe that by the definition of the RKHS introduced by K σ , functions with form h(x) = t a t K(x, x t ), x t ∈ S are dense in H(K σ ). But these functions can also be written in the form h(
S is a compact set and σ ′ is continuous, this verifies that h is an element in F RF . So F RF contains a dense set of H(K σ ) and therefore dense in H(K σ ). Then notice that the evaluation operator K σ,x is uniformly bounded for x ∈ S, so · ∞,S can be controlled by the RKHS norm and therefore complete the proof.
We then show that we can approximate elements of F RF by finite random features. Our results are inspired by [38] . For the next theorem, recall Assumption 3.1, the constant C satisfies σ ′ is C-Lipschitz, |σ
complexity inequality for Lipschitz function (Thm 12 part (4) in [7] ) together with CauchySchwartz, Jensen's inequality, we have
call this quantity µ. Then McDiarmid's inequailty implies
The theorem is proved by solving the ǫ while setting the right hand to the given δ.
Finally, we construct W * within a ball of the initialization W 0 that suffers little robust loss L * (W * ). Using the symmetric initialization, we have f (W 0 , x) = 0 for all x. We then use the neural Taylor expansion w.r.t. the parameters:
where we omitted the second order term. The term (i) has the form of the random feature approximation, and so Proposition B.1 can be used to construct a robust interpolant. In summarize, we have give the entire proof of Theorem 5.1 as follow.
Proof. Let L be the Lipschitz coefficient of the loss function ℓ.ǭ = 2 3L
. By Assumption 5.1 withǭ, there exists g 1 ∈ H(K σ ) such that
for every x ∈ B(x i ) where B(x i ) is the perturbation set.
By Lemma B.1, forǭ there is g 2 ∈ F RF such that g 1 − g 2 ∞,S ≤ǭ. Then, by Theorem B.1, we have c 1 , · · · , c m where c i ∈ R d and
with probability at least 1 − δ on the initialization w i 's. We use the neural Taylor expansion w.r.t. the parameters:
for some W 1 . Then set
and therefore
Finally, set m to be larger than
which makes the left hand in Equation (18) no more thanǭ and let B D,B,ǫ to be
Then
The theorem follows by set δ = 0.01.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
We use the ℓ 2 approximation result in [5] and translate it to an ℓ ∞ approximation result by using Lipshitz continuity. We first state Proposition 1 in [5] . 
where W * = min W∈R(W 0 ,B) L * (W) and T = Ω(
Proof. Now each step we take an update
We can compute an upper bound on the Lipschitz of ∇ W f : would make it convex. Denote R = {W| W−W 0 F ≤ 3B}. Since L A (W) = ℓ(f (W)) and ℓ is convex and has bounded derivative, we know that for W, W ′ ∈ R,
-weakly convex.
F . There are two situations during the optimization process:
Case 1. W k ∈ R holds for all k = 1, · · · , T . We have
D Proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof. We prove this theorem by an explicit construction of n 2 × d data points that F is guaranteed to be able to shatter. Consider the following data points
where c i = (5iδ, 0, · · · , 0) ⊤ ∈ R d , ǫ is a small constant, and e j = (0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0) ∈ R d is the j-th unit vector. For any labeling y i,j ∈ {1, −1}, we let P i = {j : y i,j = 1}, N i = {j : y i,j = −1}, and let #P i = k i . The idea is that for every cluster of points {x i,j } n j=1 , we use 2 disjoint balls with radius δ to separate the positive and negative data points. In fact, for every such cluster, the hyperplane
clearly separates the points into {x i,j : j ∈ P i } and {x i,j : j ∈ N i }. Then we can see easily that there exists a constant γ k i > 0 such that for any r > γ k i ǫ, there exist two Euclidean balls B r (x ′ i,1 ), B r (x ′ i,2 ) in R d with radius r, such that they contain the set {x i,j : j ∈ P i } and {x i,j : j ∈ N i } respectively, and that B r (x ′ i,1 ) and B r (x ′ i,2 ) are also separated by M i . Therefore, as long as we take
we can always put r = δ. In the case that P i or N i is empty, we can simply put one ball centered at c i and the other anywhere far away. Such balls are disjoint since ǫ ≤ δ, x ′ i,l − c i 2 ≤ 2δ for l = 1, 2, and c i − c i ′ ≥ 5δ for i = i ′ . In this way, we can use the fact that there exists a function f ∈ F such that for any i ∈ {1, · · · , n 2 }, f (x) = 1 for x ∈ B δ (x i,1 ) and f (x) = −1 for x ∈ B δ (x i,2 ). In this way, f (x i,j ) = y i,j holds for all i, j. Since the labels y i,j can be picked at will, by the definition of the VC-dimension, we know that the VC-dimension of F is always at least n 2 × d.
